





VOL. 116 JANUARY 1968 No. 3




Modem American corporate law clearly establishes the right of
corporate boards of directors to determine their own dividend policy
and protects them from stockholder suits in all but a few special
instances. As Lattin has observed:
The general rule recognized by all courts is that it is within
the sole discretion of the directors to declare or not to declare
a dividend when a legal fund is available and, barring an
abuse of discretion, the court will not interfere.'
Because the declaration of dividends usually necessitates a complicated,
technical decision requiring considerable knowledge of the internal
affairs of a corporation and its overall economic position, a court
will be reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the board of
directors 2 who not only know more about the corporation, but also
* The author wishes to thank George W. Patrick, Jr., an editor of the Review, for
his valuable legal research. The author also wishes to acknowledge the helpful criticism
of Professors Jean Crockett, Irwin Friend and Douglas Vickers of the University
of Pennsylvania.
t Associate Professor of Finance, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1946, Queens
University (Canada); Ph.D. 1950, Cornell University.
IN. LATTIN, CoRPoRATIoNs 459 (1959). See generally 19 Amd. JuRa. 2d Corpo-
rations §§ 847-50 (1962). This general rule may be modified by statutory provision.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3-16 (1953) ; N.C. GEx. STAT. § 55-50 (Supp. 1959),
providing for a mandatory annual distribution out of a predetermined reserve fund.
2 In Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 A. 941 (1905),
minority stockholders instituted a suit to compel the payment of dividends, alleging
that the board of directors had unreasonably withheld dividends, having instead almost
doubled the capital of the corporation. In holding that there was no evidence of bad
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presumably have more expertise in making business decisions.' Conse-
quently, it has been held in a stockholder's suit to compel the payment
of a dividend that the mere fact that there is a surplus is not sufficient
to move a court of equity to compel disbursal of corporate funds.4
Courts usually have required that a plaintiff also show an abuse of
discretion on the part of the directors by proving that they have been
guilty of fraud,, bad faith 8 or gross mismanagement.'
In determining whether these elements are present, courts will
examine the expressed reasons for non-declaration of dividends and
the general needs of the corporation which might require retention of
funds. Apparent hostility of a controlling faction toward a minority,'
the fact that the majority may be subject to high personal income taxes
if dividends are paid, or desire by controlling directors to acquire
minority stock interests as cheaply as possible are factors indicative of
bad faith, if they have motivated a decision to retain corporate profitsY
In determining whether the directors' decision to retain funds for
working capital is justified, a court may examine the nature of the
business enterprise; thus, a large cash reserve may not be necessary
for a prosperous manufacturing company,"0 but may be important for
faith or abuse of discretion in the board's decision, the court expressed great reluctance
to undertake the difficult task of reappraising the corporation's financial position:
This work of examining the situation of a great business corporation owning
large plants, mills, machinery, and with large business transactions on its
hands, by a court of equity in order to find out whether dividends are being
unfairly and unjustly and unreasonably withheld from the stockholders, is an
exceedingly difficult task.
Id. at 306, 60 A. at 944. See also Isley, Rights of the Minority Shareholder to the
Corporate Dividend, 2 DuKE BAR J. 113 (1952).
3 To the doctrine of discretion of the board of directors has been added the normal
rule presuming good faith in the decision not to pay dividends. In Nebel v. Nebel,
241 N.C. 491, 85 S.E.2d 876 (1955), it was stated that the use of corporate profits
for expansion of plant facilities and for purchase of new machinery is "presumed
to have been made in good faith in the absence of fraud or proof of bad faith." Id.
at 503, 85 S.E.2d at 884. Similar presumptions of good faith on the part of the directors
were made in Wilson v. American Ice Co., 206 F. 736, 739 (D.N.J. 1913) and Mulcahy
v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 144 Cal. 219, 77 P. 910 (1904).
4 See Trimble v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 61 N.J. Eq. 340, 48 A. 912 (1901).
6 See, e.g., Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 255 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1958);
Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store, 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959) ; Jones v. Costlow,
349 Pa. 136, 36 A.2d 460 (1944).
6 See, e.g., National State Bank v. Victory Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 120 N.J. Eq. 277,
184 A. 738 (1936); McLean v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 159 Pa. 112, 28 A. 211
(1893).
7 See, e.g., Midland Say. & Loan Co. v. Dunmire, 68 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1933);
Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287, 54 N.E. 17 (1899).
SSee, e.g., Channon v. Channon, 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920) ; cf. Gottfried v. Gott-
fried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
9 See, e.g., Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
10 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The
court found that corporate retention of funds in this case was intended to have a long
range benefit, not to the company, but to the public. This the court found to be
impermissible.
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a savings and loan 1 or land investment company.'2 If corporate profits
are retained to provide expansion capital, courts will be even less in-
clined to disturb the directors' decisions; but even here courts have
defined the limits of a reasonable exercise of discretion.3 In short,
"the essential test of bad faith is to determine whether the policy of
the directors is dictated by their personal interests, rather than the
corporate welfare." 14
In making the presumption that directors have acted in good
faith,' 5 courts have placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff who would
attempt to compel corporate directors to distribute profits to share-
holders.16 On the other hand, the law attaches no liability to directors
for declaring dividends, so long as they have not wilfully or negligently
imperiled the corporation's financial position.17 Thus, it may be
said that the rules of law tend to insulate dividend payout decisions
from judicial scrutiny, leaving directors to make decisions about income
retention unfettered, for the most part, by legal constraints.
11 In Midland Say. & Loan Co. v. Dunmire, 68 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1933), large
cash reserves were thought necessary for financing loans.
32 In Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N.W. 550 (1924), the
court held that the corporation was justified in holding considerable assets in light of
the fact that the company was engaged in slow development of land, rather than fast
turnover of real estate.
13 In Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 A. 941 (1905),
the court held that the retention of income to acquire additional paper mills was
necessary to keep pace with the growth of the paper industry. But, the court remarked,
if the company should attempt to buy all the paper mills in the country, a different
question would be presented. "There must come a time . . . when it is unreasonable
for directors to pursue a policy of expansion . . . It is perfectly plain that a court
of equity cannot tolerate an indefinite [expansion] . . . of this enterprise to the
practical starvation of the stockholders." Id. at 308-09, 60 A. at 945.
14 Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Sup. Ct 1947).
15 See note 3 supra. In Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299,
60 A. 941 (1905), the court stated that "where there is no charge of bad faith,
no charge of fraud, but the charge is that the directors are unreasonably refraining
from declaring a dividend . . . the court should not intervene if there is any room
for doubt." Id. at 306-07, 60 A. at 944. Similarly, the court in Penn v. Pemberton
& Penn, Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S.E.2d 823 (1949), in dismissing a bill requesting
dissolution of the corporation and distribution of its profits, stated that "If there is
any doubt about the propriety of declaring dividends, the directors are justified in
resolving the doubt against such action." Id. at 658, 53 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting 13
Am. JuRa. Corporations § 677 (1938)).
16 One commentator has suggested that the plaintiff is excessively burdened by
having to prove bad faith. See Isley, Rights of Minority Shareholders to the Corpo-
rate Dividend, 2 DuKE BAR J. 113, 123 (1952). It is there suggested that the burden
of proof should be shifted to the directors once the plaintiff has shown that there are
profits from which dividends could be paid and interests adverse to the minority
stockholders. Id.; see Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. PA. L.
REv. 735 (1941). A similar shift in the burden of proof was made in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
17At Common Law, unless directors have willfully or negligently declared
and paid dividends from an improper source, they are neither liable to the
corporation's creditors nor to the corporation or its sh~reholderm,
LATITN, supra note 1, at 490.
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Tax law, however, does encourage income retention, by making
capital gains subject to much lower tax rates than dividends., The
tenets of traditional corporation finance also encourage substantial re-
tentions." Some exponents of the new corporate finance, or financial
management as it is now called, encourage earning retentions even
more. ° Within this legal and institutional context, corporations re-
tained over 55 per cent of their after-tax profits in 1965.21 In other
years, except when profits were extraordinarily low, the retention rate
also has been substantial.
Commentators have argued that this ability to retain substantial
portions of income has freed corporations from the discipline of the
capital markets:
These large retained earnings indicate the extent to which
management decisions on allocating resources for expansion,
development of new products, and for moulding consumer
preferences are insulated from the judgment of the capital
market test of profitability.'
These commentators are substantially correct regarding the relative
importance of inside funds to capital expenditures. In 1965, retained
'8 After the corporation has paid income tax on its earnings, it may either dis-
tribute the earnings as dividends, or retain and reinvest them. If it distributes its
earnings, individuals will pay income tax on them, frequently at high personal rates.
If the corporation retains its earnings, there is a substantial likelihood that these
retentions will be reflected in a higher price for the stock. By holding the stock for
over six months, the individual can liquidate his holdings, receiving the retained
earnings as reflected in the higher price at the capital gains rate. See INT. Rxv. CODE
of 1954, §§ 1001, 1221, 1222. Moreover, if the corporation liquidates or distributes
its corporate assets, the benefitting stockholder may be taxed at the capital gains rate.
See generally, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, subchapter C, §§ 301-95. The Internal Revenue
Code, however, does impose a high surtax on improperly accumulated corporate surplus.
See note 49 infra.
Not all industrial countries follow this particular practice. In Germany, for
example, corporations pay 15 per cent on dividends declared and 50 per cent on
retentions. Individuals receiving dividends pay 25 per cent. This tax structure is
designed in part to promote financing through the capital markets.
19 See H. GUTHMAN AND H. DoUGALL, CoRPo TE FINANCIAL POLICY, ch. 26
(1962).
20 See Lintner, Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and Supply of Capital
to Corporations, 44 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 243 (1962); Miller & Modigliani, Divi-
dend Policy and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961). But see M. GORDON,
THE INvEsTmENT, FINANCING AND VALUATION OF THE CORPORATION (1962).
2 1 ECONOmic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 1966, at 284. This retention ratio is
higher than the figures for other years cited in much of the literature. Earlier esti-
mates had indicated that the retention rate for 1964 was roughly 37 per cent. How-
ever, corporate profit estimates have been substantially increased, so that now the
1964 retention ratio is estimated to be slightly less than 55 per cent.
22 Berle, Modem Punctions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 433
(1962) ; Sabatino, The Responsible Corporation, 25 Am. J. EcoN. & SOCIOLOGY 255,
262 (1962). This is not the only reason some authors are disturbed by large earnings
retention. By facilitating growth, such retentions contribute to the development of
substantial private power centers. Whether or not the legal apparatus should be
designed to discourage retentions in order to retard the growth of private power is
a separate question. This article is solely concerned with the need.for discouraging
retention as a means of improving resource allocation.
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earnings accounted for over 25 per cent of total corporate sources of
funds and over 45 per cent of expenditures on non-residential fixed
investment.' The ratio of inside funds (retained earnings plus de-
preciation) to total sources was over 70 per cent.24 This situation
raises the question whether or not funds are being allocated as efficiently
as they might be if channeled through the capital markets. It raises
the spectre of funds being deflected into low-yield undertakings by
firms that have substantial volumes of retained earnings and deprecia-
tion, while highly profitable investment opportunities which could pro-
duce highly desired goods (otherwise the undertakings would not be
so profitable) are foregone, because the firms to which these oppor-
tunities are available are unable to raise the funds on the capital market
at rates commensurate with the risks involved. The assumption of
those advocating increased payout seems to be that if all profits were
distributed, the supply of funds on the capital markets would increase
more than the demand. Since the relatively unprofitable investment
opportunities would not be undertaken, the increase in the demand for
funds on the capital markets would not be proportional to the increased
supply. The market cost of funds for those socially desirable projects
would therefore tend to fall. This line of reasoning assumes that
the stockholder would be willing to invest all the additional dividends
in the capital markets. There are no clear a priori reasons to expect
that this will be so.
It is the purpose of this article to inquire whether the spectre of
malallocation is a real or fictitious problem. Part I develops the
theme that management is sensitive to the equity markets, although
existing evidence does not establish that management is or is not as
sensitive as is required for full optimization of resource allocation.
Part II argues that raising funds on the capital markets is not a neces-
sary condition for efficient allocation. Part III examines the capital
budgeting methods of management to see if large corporations use
techniques for screening capital expenditures which offer conditions
for efficient resource allocation. Such techniques are not widely used,
but there is evidence that firms achieve results consistent with their
use; the firms behave "as if" they use the appropriate techniques. In
Part IV the evidence examined suggests neither over- nor under-
investment by large firms. Finally, Part V suggests that forcing full
payout is not likely to improve resource allocation. The cost of dis-
23 EcoNomic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 1966, at 287.
24 Id.
25 This examination is not based on new research. Instead it marshalls the evi-
dence of a number of investigations, many of which were undertaken for reasons not
even remotely related to the problem at hand.
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tributing the funds to the investors and then retrieving the funds must
be offset against any improvement in allocation which conceivably
might result.
I
Even if large publicly traded corporations do not depend upon
the capital markets for funds, the discipline of these markets may never-
theless be felt by management. This is particularly true if management
is concerned with the welfare of the stockholders and therefore is
sensitive to the market performance of their stock. The significance
of such concern should not be exaggerated, however. Management
easily may be interested in the stock doing well, may refrain from
activity which will seriously impair the stock's performance and under-
take activity which will improve the stock's performance. However,
it is difficult to determine whether management, under these circum-
stances, is merely doing well or doing the best that can be done. In
the literature of financial management, it is assumed that management
tries to maximize the net worth of the existing stockholder's interests.
The question here is whether or not this is so."
The useful evidence on the question of management's interest in
the stockholder is largely anecdotal and a priori. Recently, for example,
it has been pointed out that reports of the deliberations of the top levels
of management in major American corporations seem to indicate a
widespread concern with the performance of the companies' securities.
Even in companies which have long refrained from the issuance of
new shares, and which have made no plans for such issues in the fore-
seeable future, there seems to be a heavy preoccupation with the
market's evaluation of their shares.2
Lack of concern with the performance of the securities on the
equity market is wholly inconsistent with the fact that major executives
of one or another large corporation appear at almost every meeting of
the New York Society of Security Analysts. This group holds five
luncheon meetings a week throughout most of the year. The cor-
porate officers who appear are usually presidents or top financial offi-
cers. The analyst and the financial officer encounter each other in
other situations as well. Many security analysts spend a good deal
2 6 In the matter of management goals, writers in the field of economic and financial
theory seem to be out of step with much of the rest of the world. See generally J.
GALBRArrH, THE NEv INDUSTRIAL STATE, (1967); Mundheim, The Institutional
Investor as a Shareholder: The British Experience, THE IxsTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Jan. 1968, at 36. If management does not pursue the goal of profit maximization,
serious problems are raised. The pricing system cannot do its job and much of the
rationale of the system of private property becomes questionable. The legitimacy
of managerial goals and decisions are then also highly questionable.
27 W. BAUmOL, THE STOCK MARKET Am EcoNo Ic EFFiciENcY 79 (1965).
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of time either talking to corporate executives on the telephone or visit-
ing them. At one time, Union Carbide reported that it was visited
by two analysts a day.' It is not surprising then to find companies
suggesting in their advertising that their stock is performing well.
There are many explanations, of varying degrees of plausibility,
for managements' concern with the stock market, even when there is
no intention of raising funds on the market. Among the least im-
portant reasons is the matter of better public relations. More im-
portantly, management is concerned with the market performance of
its stock because poor performance is highly likely to produce an
unhappy set of stockholders. An unhappy set of stockholders may, in
turn, produce a proxy fight with the consequent loss of control by
current management. In their recently published study of proxy
contests, Richard M. Duvall and Douglas V. Austin found that
corporations whose rate of return on net worth and profit
margins are low relative to other companies in their industry
grouping are contested more frequently and with greater
success than companies whose performance is characterized
by high rates of return on equity capital, high profit margins,
good earnings per share, and generous dividend payouts.
To be sure, blue chip companies are rarely subjected to proxy fights.
Berle " is correct in noting that such fights have eliminated, at best,
only a small minority of inefficient managements in the United States.
Although it is possible that the threat of proxy fights may have made
many a management toe the line, little importance can be attached to
it. Proxy contests are unlikely to be successful unless the performance
of management is significantly below reasonable expectations. Manage-
ment only need perform moderately well-which is not necessarily at
its best-to avoid these challenges.
Perhaps more important is the fact that there is a good deal of
trading in firms. A significant number of mergers and acquisitions
are affected through the exchange of stock. Failure of management
to perform in a way which is reflected in a favorable stock price move-
ment may prove costly if the firm is involved in a merger either as
buyer or seller. The relative share of future interest and dividends
is not all that is at stake. There is also the even more important ques-
tion of the power structure of the surviving firm. Significantly,
management cannot relax its stock market vigil just because it is not
2 8 FINANCrAL MANAGEMENT IN THE 1960's: NEv CHALLENGES AND RESPONSI-
B'LrrIES, READINGS FRO FORTUNE 7 (J. Weston ed. 1965).
29 Duvall and Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests, 20 J. FINANCE
464 (1965).
30o Berle, supra note 20, at 438.
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contemplating mergers in the near future. Although undoubtedly
once an acquisition or merger is in sight, management can and
often does engage in a number of financial maneuvers designed to
improve the market value of its stock,31 there are, on the one hand,
limits to what can be done and, on the other, the possibility that if
the maneuvers were started when the stock was selling at a higher
price, those maneuvers would bring the stock to a new price com-
mensurate with the higher base.
Of lesser significance is the tendency of corporations to buy
their own equities. This practice is now widespread and seems to be
growing.3 Naturally corporations would like to buy such stock
cheaply, but are hardly likely to manipulate the price of the stock in
order to do so. Repurchases, which are alternatives to dividends,3 are
difficult to rationalize with supposed management indifference to the
stockholder interest.
When all is said and done, there is one fact which is extremely
hard to controvert. Management often reports that it does not want
to issue equity because doing so will dilute earnings. There are few
who would challenge the sincerity of that statement; yet it is very
difficult to reconcile this attitude with any proposition that manage-
ment has little concern for the stockholders, or that management is not
highly sensitive to the stockholder and the market.
The real discipline of the capital markets may stem from the
possibility of take-over.34 Take-over possibilities arise when manage-
ment's performance permits the price of the stock to fall significantly
below a value commensurate with the resources of the firm. When
the underpricing is sufficiently great to give elbow room to a potential
take-over group which sees the lines of action to be taken to correct
the price of the stock, the existing management can be significantly
31 They may split the stock or increase the dividend, especially the latter. Some-
times the acquiring firm may buy its own stock, but the circumstances under which
it may do so are circumscribed. See SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32 Corporate repurchases of their own stock recently have been running in excess
of one half of the net purchases of pension funds and double those of mutual funds.
See Guthert, More Companies Are Buying Back Their Stock, 43 HARv. Bus. REv.
March-April 1965, at 40.
33 Such repurchases have a multiple effect: they represent increased demand,
which increases the price; they decrease the number of shares outstanding, which
increases the per share earnings, which, finally, also may increase the price.
34 The effectiveness of this discipline may be impaired if the Williams tender
offer bill, S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), now before the House, is passed. The
bill ostensibly is designed to protect the investor. It is much more likely to protect
entrenched management See Mundheim, Why the Bill on Tender Offers Should
Not Be Passed, THE INSTrrJTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1967, at 24 (1967). The timing
of this bill and the publication of Galbraith's new book, mspra note 26, is interesting.
Whatever the bill's expressed purpose, its effect is to increase the insulation of
management from the market.
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threatened. However, the possibility of a take-over at most will force
management to take the lines of action which will make its stock
perform reasonably well. Rarely is it possible to buy a sufficient quan-
tity of stock to take over the control of a corporation without signif-
icantly pushing up the price of that stock. If the prevailing price of
the stock were at a reasonable level, this inevitable price rise might push
the price over the point where the take-over bid will be worthwhile-
the stock will no longer be undervalued. The take-over threat leaves
management with plenty of breathing space and the market discipline
is only partially felt.
There is at least one factor, however, which causes the interests
of the stockholder and management in the performance of the stock
to diverge slightly. This is the widespread use of stock options.35
There is some evidence that a large share of managerial earnings comes
from holding options. There is, thus, reason to believe that the stock
option helps close the gap between ownership and control much more
effectively than Berle is willing to concede.3 ' However, it also must
be remembered that while the option holder may share in benefits of
market performance with the stockholder, the option holder does not
have rights to dividends. A high dividend payout is an impediment to
the rate of growth of the share price and, as a consequence, manage-
ment, as option-holder, would prefer low payouts. T
It is probable that large corporations are more sensitive to their
stockholders than are the smaller corporations, which would presumably
be the beneficiaries of a larger flow of funds through the capital market.
Only too frequently one hears of dissatisfied stockholders not being
able to influence management because a small coterie of stockholders
holds a large percentage of the stock. The coterie can ride roughshod
over the remaining stockholders. Similarly, one of the arguments of
investment bankers for justifying their place on the board of directors
of a budding company is that insiders are not stockholder-oriented.
Much of this, of course, conceivably could change if these corporations,
too, had to depend on the capital market for funds.
3 "By 1958, 82 percent of the manufacturers having sales of $50 million or more
(86 percent of those with sales of over $400 million) had stock options for their
executives." White, The Changing Criteria in Investment Planning, in JOINT Eco-
No Ic CoammrrrEE, 87TH CoNG., 2D SEss., VARiABiTry OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 22 (1962), citing Fox, Current Stock Option Plans, 21
MANAGEMENT RxcolD 270 (1959) and Rothschild, Financing Stock Purchases by
Executives, 35 1-.mv. Bus REV., March-April 1957, at 136.
36 See Berle, supra note 22, at 437.
37 It might be noted parenthetically that this is one reason why shareholders
might prefer dividends to capital gains. Capital gains which are reflected in retained
earnings must necessarily be shared with the option holders. The income associated
with dividends, which can in turn be reinvested in stock, accrues solely to the investor.
See note 57 infra.
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The concern of corporate management with the welfare of stock-
holders does not automatically lead to optimal allocation. Management
can carry capital expenditures too far or not far enough, but if it does
not miss the mark excessively, the company will perform reasonably well
and generate little stockholder dissatisfaction. The odds are against
much unwarranted investment, except by mistake. While under the
current SEC rules corporations do not have to report divisional results
to the stockholder, division and department managers do report their
particular results to top management.' Typically one prefers not to
have command over unprofitable operations. There are better ways
to build empires.
Nevertheless, a relatively unprofitable empire may be better than
none. As we noted, concern for stockholders should not be confused
with identifying with stockholders. Evidence of such lack of identity
is easy to find. Over a decade ago, John Lintner wrote of "executives
. . . who were most inclined to view the interests of the company
as distinct from those of the stockholders." " Relevant to the im-
mediate problem of this article, Oliver Williamson argued that "as the
proportional representation of management on the board [of directors]
increases, . . . stockholder interests tend to be subordinated to manage-
ment objectives." " This was manifested in both the direct relation-
ship between compensation of management and the representation of
management on the board and the direct relationship between that
representation and the proportion of earnings retained."' The high
proportional representation of management on the board [of directors]
proportion of earnings retained may have reflected the absence from
the board of investment bankers pressing for external financing. One
must be a little skeptical, however, of this alternative explanation. It
almost suggests that investment banker representation on boards of
directors is inversely proportional to management representation. This
is not likely to be so, even though the probability that there will be
some investment banker representation presumably would vary in-
versely with manager representation. Whether this is enough to pro-
duce the relationship Williamson found is problematic. If retention
policy is determined by expansionary goals as well as profit considera-
tions, the rate of return will tend to be below the level which might be
attained if capital expenditures were determined by profit considerations
88 The concern with judging divisional performance is reflected in D. SOLOMONS,
DIVIsONiAL PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL (1965).
39 Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. Ecox. REv. 100 (1945).
4 0 Williamson, Managerid Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. Ecox. REV.
1032, 1047 (1963).
4 1 Id. at 1047-59.
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alone. If at the same time, the more dominant the expansionary goals,
the more will be retained, as Williamson argues, one should find an
inverse relationship between retention rate and rate of return. This is
the conclusion to which his logic led him. He argued that his con-
clusion is consistent with the empirical findings of Gordon 4 and
Scott,4 3 and, we may add, with those of Rayner and Little.44 The
latter have reported that they could find no relation between payout
ratio and growth rate of earnings per share. For a firm with a constant
rate of return which is wholly financed with internal funds, the realized
growth of earnings per share will equal the realized rate of return on
equity times the retention ratio. 5 An inverse relationship between the
42 M. GoRDox, THE INVESTuENT, FINANCING AND VALUATION OF THE CORPORATION
231 (1962).
43 Scott, Relative Share Prices and Yields, 14 OxFoRD Ec0Nozmc PAEas, N.S.,
October 1962, at 244.
44A. RAYNER & I. LITTE, HIwaLEDY PIGGLEDY GROWTH AGAIN 54-58 (1966).
To be sure, the results reported here apply to United Kingdom firms, but there are
no reasons to expect the situation to be different in the United States.
45 This can be seen by some simple algebraic manipulations. For convenience
let us use the following symbols:
E t = earnings per share in year t
t = book value per share
r = rate of return on both new and existing equity
R = rate of growth of earnings per share
b = retention ratio, i.e., percentage of earnings reinvested
in the firm by management.
By the definition of r we may write
(1) E198o = rK196o
and
(2) E 1961 = rKI96i.
From the definition of b, we can see that
(3) K1961 = Kigoo + bE1960.
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) we have
(4) E1961 = r(Ki9o + bE96o)
From the definition of R, we can see that
(5) Eipo, = (1 + R)Eigoo
from which it follows that
E 1961
(6) - = + R-
E 1960
On the left hand side of (6) we may substitute the right hand side of (4) into the
numerator and the right hand side of (1) into the denominator. Multiplying through
by r and eliminating the parenthesis in the numerator leaves us
rKw96o + rbEg9o
rKi9so
This fraction can be decomposed into the two fractions
rKioso rbEl96o+
rK196o rK196o




Dividing the denominator into the numerator leaves the left hand side of (6) equal to
1 + rb.
Since it is also equal to 1 + R, it follows that
R = rb. Q.E.D.
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latter two variables can easily result in no relationship between growth
of earnings per share and the retention ratio.
But this evidence is defective on two grounds. Most firms do not
rigorously eschew all external financing. If such financing resulted in
the sale of over-priced stock, a portion of the acquired assets would
accrue to the existing stockholder. His earnings per share therefore
would increase. The propensity to issue such equity conceivably could
be directly related with the payout ratio. It is unlikely, however, that
this particular phenomenon contributed much to the reported results.
Too little equity is issued to affect any relationship between growth and
payout. Debt financing will also affect the Rayner-Little results, and
probably did. Although the ratio of debt to equity financing is quite
stable, the degree of leverage is always in a state of flux, so that there
need be little stability in the average rate of return. More important,
the relevant rate of return is the rate earned on new investment, which
may or may not be the same as that earned on existing capital. The
rate discussed in all the alleged evidence is the average rate of return.
This evidence is therefore not so much supporting as irrelevant.
This, therefore, adds little credence to the case against earnings
retention. Certainly one can build a strong case against the dis-
cretionary power with respect to dividends of corporations controlled
by closely knit or family groups, which hold a sufficiently large per-
centage of the stock outstanding so that they cannot be coerced by
either proxy or take-over threats.46 Such firms may be much more
interested in providing sinecures for the family,47 than in maximizing
the market value of the stock for the stockholders. It is in this type
of corporate situation that the stockholder's suit for undue retention
46 For an argument sharply restricting the exercise of discretionary power in
the case of a closely held corporation, see Note, Proposals to Help the Minority Stock-
holder Receive Dividend Treatment From the Closely Held Corporation, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 503, 507-08 (1961).
One reason usually given for distinguishing between public and closely held cor-
porations is that the minority shareholder of a closely held company runs the risk
of greater harm:
The owner of readily salable stock can realize the accumulated profits in the
form of increased value of his holdings, while the stockholder in the closed
corporation is forced to rely for the most part on the declaration of dividends.
In view of the fact that the great majority of cases in which relief has been
granted involved stock which was not readily marketable, it would seem that
such a consideration plays no small part in the decisions of the courts.
Isley, Rights of Minority Shareholders to the -Corporate Dividends, 2 Dumc BAR J.
113, 116 (1952).
47In Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914),
members of the board who were majority shareholders paid themselves what the
court thought to be excessive salaries out of funds which should have gone to paying
dividends to the minority holder. Similarly, in Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper
Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 A. 941 (1905), the court held that the single controlling
shareholder and his son (who was first vice-president) received excessive salaries.
The court ordered these amounts reduced and the difference added to funds out of
which dividends could be declared.
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of earnings is most likely to be successful, 48 and in which the Internal
Revenue Service is most likely to claim that there is an excessive ac-
cumulation of earnings. 9 Occasionally, this type of firm is thoroughly
shaken by the entry of a new and vigorous competitor into the industry.
By and large there exists a very real possibility that closely held firms
are the ones that are impervious to the capital markets. These then
are the firms whose retention power perhaps should be curtailed. Un-
fortunately, forced distribution channels the funds through manage-
ment's hands, since management in such firms is not truly divorced
from ownership. The misuse of resources is only partially curtailed.
It is limited to the extent that, in the distribution process, the govern-
ment will take its share. It is also curtailed to the extent that, with
the disappearance of the tax advantage of retention, the funds may
be diverted to other uses.
The case against retentions by large, widely held firms, however,
is hardly established. The empirical studies cited are anything but
definitive. Furthermore, there exists other evidence that managements
of large firms do not use retained resources inefficiently. This evidence
can best be understood in the context of another line of reasoning to
which we now turn.
II
Even absent direct evidence that management is stockholder-
and capital-market-sensitive, it still could be argued that there is no
a priori reason why failure to use external funds necessarily must lead
to malallocation of resources.5° If the capital budgeting procedures are
appropriate, the budgeting criteria themselves provide the link to the
capital markets.
48 See, e.g., Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 1951), in
which minority interests alleged that the board of directors was dominated by a single
owner of a majority interest (who was also on the board). It was maintained that
a dividend was not declared because the majority owner would be taxed excessively
on the profits, once through his controlling corporation and again on personal income
tax. The court, in denying a motion to dismiss, held that the directors "wrongfully
refused to declare dividends from available funds . . . for reasons not related to
the conduct of the corporation's business." Id. at 390.
49 The Internal Revenue Code imposes a surtax on improperly accumulated cor-
porate profits. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-33. See note on High Surtax on
Improperly Accumulated Surplus: Section 102 of the Interiw Revenue Code [Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, essentially similar to the foregoing sections of the 1954 Code],
BALLANTINE, LATTIN & JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 763
(2d ed. 1953).
50 In a world of uncertainty, mistakes will inevitably occur so that a firm over
time will occasionally under-invest and occasionally over-invest. Similarly, at any
point of time, some firms will under-invest and others over-invest. If the mistakes
are due solely to uncertainty, the errors will be random and there will be no persistent
tendency for funds to be excessive or deficient in any sphere of private business
activity. One must, therefore, distinguish between the inefficiency in the allocative
mechanism which can be measured by range of the random error and the inefficiency
attributable to persistent bias in allocation. This latter type of inefficiency is the
primary concern of this article. In neither case is there necessarily under- or over-
investment in the economy. Our concern is with the distribution of investment.
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In the current literature, the recommended decision rules for
capital budgeting are premised on the proposition that equal amounts
of cash received at different dates are not equivalent. The most
elementary example of this proposition is that anybody can deposit
$1.00 in a savings bank and receive $1.04 one year later. Since $1.00
today can be converted into $1.04 a year from now, no one with
sound business sense would accept less in an arm's length transaction
than $1.04 one year from now as the equivalent of $1.00 today. It
follows that each dollar expected one year from now-with the same
confidence that we have that savings bank funds will be forthcoming-
has a present day equivalent or a present value of $1.00/1.04."'
Similarly, a dollar to be received two years from now will have a
present value of $1.00/1.04 one year from now. This quantity in
turn has a current present value of $1.00/(1.04)2. By analogy $1.00
to be received n years from now has a current present value of
$1.00/(1.04)-. If one were to receive a stream of annual payments
of $1.00 each for ten years beginning one year from now, that stream
would have a present value equal to the sum of the present values of
each element of the stream or $1.00/(1.04) + $1.00/(1.04)2 +
$1.00/(1.04)3 + . . + $1.00/(1.04)O. This process of evaluating
a future sum of money or an expected stream is called discounting, and
the number inside the parentheses, reduced by one, is called the discount
rate. The discount rate in the above example is ".04."
The present value concept is crucial to the rule of capital budgeting,
the rule most widely accepted among economists. The rule for selecting
among independent investment proposals is that any investment oppor-
tunity which has a present value in excess of the cost (or present value
of the cost if the outlays are made over an extended period of time)
should be undertaken.5' A critical element in the capital budgeting
decision is the rate of discount to apply to the streams of cash receipts
that are expected to be generated by the investment proposals under
consideration. Whether or not a corporate decision determined by
the present value rule is subject to the discipline of the capital market
depends upon the discount rate the corporation chooses.
In the literature, the recommended discount rate is the "cost of
capital," the weighted average cost of the various kinds of funds the
corporation uses.3 In computing the cost of capital, the costs of the
51 In this example it is assumed that the interest rate and other rates of return
do not change over time. The assumption is a pedagogical convenience, in no way
essential to the argument
52 For a good discussion of capital budgeting, see H. BIERMAN, JR. & S. SMmT,
THE CAPrrAL BUDGEtING DEcisIoN (6th ed. 1965).
E. SOLOMON, THE THEORY OF FiNANciAL MANAGEMENT 69-75 (1963). The
weights are based on the market value of the securities.
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various types of funds which ought to be considered are the rates
of return investors expect on each type of fund. Thus the cost of
equity is the rate of return the stockholders expect on their stock. For
this purpose, the expected return of stock is the discount rate which,
on the average, will make the expected dividend plus the expected value
of the stock one year from now have a present value equal to the cur-
rent market price.5 The cost of capital is the appropriate rate of
discount, regardless of how the investment is to be financed.55 If the
discount rate were not the average cost of all available types of funds,
the following type of anomaly could occur. Year One: an investment
proposal earning 6 per cent is financed with debt that costs 4 per cent.56
Year Two: because of the amount of debt now outstanding, the cor-
poration is forced to utilize external equity to finance further capital
expenditures. If the cost of equity is 15 per cent, the corporation
would now reject a proposal that yielded only 12 per cent, twice the
rate of return of the asset financed the preceding year. The corporation
would have been better off foregoing the 6 per cent and waiting. This
kind of problem is avoided if the cost of capital (the average cost of
all the funds available) is consistently applied, rather than the cost
of the particular type of the funds used. The use of a uniform discount
rate assumes that all funds used go into a common pool and that every
asset is purchased from a pool made up of different kinds of funds in
the same proportions that are found in the whole capital structure. The
basic assumption is that funds are fungible, which in fact they are.
For capital budgeting purposes the price at which stock was orig-
inally sold is unimportant. The relevant value of the stock is its
average market price. Rates used in computing the cost of capital
should be based upon current values, not original values. Since the
market value of the equity is the value of the entire claim of the stock-
54 This is an over-simplification. The only serious difficulty with it, however, is
that the current market price is really the fundamental investment price plus or minus
some random deviation.
55 Some authors have suggested that the cost of capital is not appropriate at all.
See, e.g., Linter, The Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing of Corporate Growth,
18 J. FINANCE 292 (1963) ; Lerner & Carleton, Integration of Capital Budgeting and
Stock Evaluation, 54 Am. EcoN. REv. 683 (1964). On the other hand, the basic
defect in the logic of the above authors has been laid bare in Vickers, Profitability
and Reinvestment Rates: A Note on the Gordon Paradox, 39 J. Bus. 366 (1966).
A broader criticism of the Lerner-Carleton thesis can be found in Crockett & Friend,
The Integration of Capital Budgeting and Stock Evaluation, 57 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 214
(1967).
66 The rate of return is the particular discount rate which makes the present
value of a proposal equal to its cost. Generally if the rate of return is greater than
the discount rate required by the corporation, the present value of the asset will be
above the cost of the asset and the asset is therefore usually worthwhile buying. For
technical reasons the use of the rate of return as a selective device is not completely
the equivalent of using present values. For our purposes, however, this lack of
equivalence is unimportant. See Lorie & Savage, Three Problems in Rationing Capital,
28 J. Bus. 229 (1955).
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holders against the company, the earnings historically retained are
automatically included and no separate allowance has to be made
for them. Except for the difference in the cost of raising the funds,
it makes no difference whether the equity funds come from retained
earnings or new issues, as far as the computation of the cost of the
equity is concerned."' Thus, a market rate of return enters into the
decision-making processes whether or not the firms raise funds on the
equity market. The discipline of the capital market on a firm is effec-
tive as long as it uses the present value criteria in capital budgeting
and the cost of capital as the rate of return in finding the present value.
This capital budgeting procedure also will maximize the net
worth of the stockholder's investment. The cost of equity can be de-
fined as the rate of return the stockholder uses to determine the present
day equivalent of the next dividend and the liquidation value of the
stock one year hence. The liquidation value of the stock one year hence
is equivalent to the present value one year hence of the dividend to be
received in the second year plus the liquidation value of the stock at
the end of the second year. Similarly, the expected liquidation values
of the stock at the end of the second year, third year, fourth year and
so on, can be decomposed. Thus the stockholders' expected rate of
return is the discount rate which translates the stream of all future
dividends into the current value of the stock. The value of retained
earnings reflected in the market value of the stock is the present value
of the stream of dividends generated by the resources financed with
the retained earnings. This present value is maximized when the re-
sources acquired by the firm are the most productive available. Thus,
maximizing the net worth of stockholder interest and efficient allocation
are logically equivalent.
Therefore, if all firms used the present value rule as their capital
budgeting technique and if they all used their cost of capital as the
discount rate, the failure to offer securities to the public would not
inhibit the achievement of efficient allocation. The failure to use the
present value rule, however, does not lead necessarily to inefficient
allocation. In the two sections which follow we will advance the
proposition that, among the large publicly held firms, the appropriate
capital budgeting technique is not used widely enough to achieve efficient
67 This is subject to some qualification. If the investors seek a given cash income,
investment in low payout stocks may require a strategy of periodic liquidations. While
on the average the cash flow should not be affected, the investor assumes an additional
risk of price fluctuations if he pursues this strategy. The range of possible outcomes
of his investments is thus widened and there is more risk involved. In a world of
partnership taxation, this is much more important than under the existing tax structure
and along with transaction costs make dividends preferable to capital gains. The
rate of return on a low payout stock may thus be higher than that on a high payout
stock.
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allocation by itself, but that management acts "as if" such rules were
used and the implicit rate of return targets are such that there is no
evidence that large firms tend to under-invest or over-invest.
III
It is not absolutely essential to efficient allocation that management
use "scientific" capital budgeting techniques. Firms that do not may
operate "as if" they did, so that their procedures closely approximate
the results of using "scientific" procedures. We often behave in
accordance with scientific models of behavior, even though most of
us do not know the mathematics involved. Management may make
instinctive allowances for the deficiencies in their procedures, so that
the results very well may conform to those which would be produced
if management were using what we consider scientific methods. There-
fore, an examination of procedures actually used is desirable. The
evidence suggests that although purely scientific procedures are not
widespread, behavior which approximates those procedures very well
may be common.
Since the Second World War there have been periodic surveys
of the capital budgeting methods used by business. There exists little
evidence either that present value techniques are becoming more wide-
spread or that stock values are not being optimized. The McGraw-Hill
survey for 1948 " provided a good deal of evidence that the required
payback period was quite short,"9 but little evidence on how widely the
payback period was used. Subsequent studies probed more deeply into
the methods used, and were less concerned with projections of capital
expenditures. One of the earliest was the Schwab survey.' Schwab
found that about 56 per cent of the firms in a relatively small sample
of large firms used a rate-of-return approach.61 A still later survey 2
suggests that between 1958 and 1960 there was a sharp decline in the
percentage of firms using either the payback period alone or the rate-
of-return alone or in any combination and a sharp increase in the use
8 See Capital Spending Plans 1949-1953, BosIrss WEEK, Jan. 22, 1949, at 54.
69 The payback period is some variant of the ratio of the cost of the project to
annual net receipts. This ratio indicates the number of years it takes to break even.
80 Schwab, Capital Expenditure Evaluation, 26 THE Co P'rmorLLR 359 (1958).
61 There is some confusion in the literature between the rate-of-return defined
as the yield or discount rate which equates the expected stream to the cost of the
investment and the rate-of-return which is simply the ratio of some measure of income
over the average amount invested. In this article the phrase "rate-of-return" will
always refer to the first kind of rate-of-return. The second kind of rate-of-return
will always be called the "average rate-of-return." There is some evidence that this
survey was somewhat biased in favor of firms using sophisticated methods. See
White, supra note 35, at 9.
62 Miller, A Glimpse at Practice in Calbulating and Using Return on Investihent,
NAA BuLLuri, June 1960, at 65.
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of the average rate-of-return. Thirty per cent reported using rate-of-
return. As in the case of the earlier study, there is evidence that the
survey also was biased in favor of firms using sophisticated methods.'
The whole problem was surveyed by White," who argued quite
strongly that since the 1955 McGraw-Hill survey, the rate-of-return
methods have become more prevalent. However, White's position is
weakened considerably by evidence that he confused the rate-of-return
method with the average rate-of-return method. If one could rely on
the casual reports by students returning for visits from their jobs, on
casual contacts with company executives and on articles in publications
such as The Harvard Business Review, one would conclude that
business firms seem to be switching away from excessive reliance upon
naive methods to reliance on fairly sophisticated procedures.
There is, unfortunately, no real evidence in the surveys of any
such trend. The most recent survey is one made in the latter part
of 1964 by George A. Christy.6 5 Like the earlier studies, his survey
was of fairly large firms. There was, however, less indication, except
for size, that the firms included in his sample were better managed
than other firms, as was the case in the earlier surveys. It is interest-
ing that despite increasing awareness of sophisticated methods, the
coming of age of the computer and the increasingly widespread use of
operations research, less than 15 per cent of the firms in Christy's
sample used a rate-of-return type method. Clearly a substantial num-
ber of firms still used decision rules for which there is little apparent
rationale. For a substantial number of firms, therefore, the procedures
in use do not give rise to a presumption of efficient allocation. In the
long run, however, even if allocation were indeed inefficient, the dis-
tortion would be limited. To the extent that firms use funds poorly,
they generate less new funds to malallocate. As we have suggested,
evidence that the failure of large business firms to utilize "scientific"
capital budgeting procedures is not as deplorable as it might at first
appear. There is little evidence that inefficiency arising from error is
increased. There is evidence that management behaves so as to ap-
proximate the use of scientific methods.
Christy divided his sample of firms into five groups whose earning
trends could be characterized as: steadily upward; predominantly up-
ward; about level; predominantly downward; and steadily downward.
He cross-classified the firms by earning trend and the methods of
project ranking and came to the following conclusions:
63 See White, supra note 35, at 10.
64 Id.
65 G. CHRIST, CAPrrAL BUDGErING: CURRENT PRACTICES AND THEm EFFICIENCY
(Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Oregon, 1966).
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The gist of these figures is to demolish the veiled suggestion,
so often encountered in theoretical writings, that payback
methods are associated with inferior managements. 6  [And
the data] utterly failed to indicate that "successful" companies
are distinguished by any particular mechanics of project
ranking. The payback method, dismissed by most academic
writers as at best a screening device, holds up as well in these
statistics as the vaunted-and supposedly scientific-dis-
counted cash flow methods."
A careful examination of the reported figures at first does not
seem to support so harsh a judgment of the discounted cash-flow
method. Fifty-three per cent of the firms reporting that they used
some variant of the discounted cash-flow method, either alone or in
combination with other measures, were included in those whose earn-
ings trends were either steadily upward or predominantly upward.
Only 43 per cent of the remaning firms were in this category. It would
be nice for the academician if we could attach significance to this com-
parison. Unfortunately, the number of firms in the sample using the
discounted cash-flow method alone or in combination with other
methods is much too small to supply any truly conclusive evidence.
There is, however, evidence that the discounted cash-flow method is
associated with superior management in the fact that those surveys
which tended to cover the better managed firms had a much higher
percentage of firms using the discounted cash-flow method than
Christy's survey, which had no such bias.
Since this is so, if it could be demonstrated that the discounted
cash-flow method was extensively used, the allocative mechanism would
have given us little cause for concern. Fortunately the failure to prove
that the discounted cash-flow method is widely used, does not lead to
the contrary conclusion.
IV
Even if the firms surveyed did not reflect any differential behavior
attributable to capital budgeting procedures, they nevertheless could
be under- or over-investing as a group if the implicit discount rates
were too high or too low. An exploration of the literature for evi-
dence of such inefficiency is therefore useful.
The early McGraw-Hill surveys suggested that the required pay-
back period was quite short-in the vicinity of five years. In Christy's
study, 35 companies used the paycheck period as their sole standard.
Thirty-three of these indicated what their minimum payback period
66 Id. at 15.
67Id. at 16.
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was. Of these 33, 27 had a payback period of less than six years.'
It has been estimated that the average life of industrial machinery and
equipment for depreciation purposes in the post-War period was ap-
proximately twenty years.' If the expected cash flow is assumed to
be distributed evenly over the lifetime of the asset, the payback period
represents the price paid for an annuity of $1 over the lifetime of the
asset." Since the average payback period in the McGraw-Hill survey
was five years and the average depreciable life of the asset was about
twenty years, business firms could be said to have been paying $5 for
twenty-year annuities of $1 per year. That involves a yield of roughly
19 per cent. The payback periods reported were defined gross of
corporate income taxes and, therefore, assuming straight line de-
preciation and a 50 per cent tax rate, the after tax return was roughly
11 per cent. In the Christy study, the average payback period clearly
was less than five years, but the study does not indicate whether pay-
backs were reported gross of taxes. The yields in the Christy study
seemed to be in the same vicinity.
Recent studies suggest that the cost of equity has been around
9 per cent.7' However, few firms are without debt. In 1950, the
ayerage ratio of all debt to total invested funds (valued at market)
was a little less than .50. If we eliminated all debt but mortgages,
bonds and notes from both the numerator and the denominator, the
ratio is still about .30." The cost of capital for all non-financial firms
has been, therefore, less than 9 per cent.
This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there has
been a tendency to under-invest. First, the estimates are quite crude,
and there is no way of determining the range of error. Second, the
cost of capital is only indirectly measured. It represents the realized
rate of return instead of the anticipated rate of return. Third, the
appropriate rate of return for new investment may well be in excess
of the rate of return on existing investment since results of new invest-
ment cannot be anticipated as accurately. Fourth, the evidence on
both cost of capital and equity is drawn from a universe that includes
6s Id. at 47.
69R. GoLsmrrH, THE NATIONAL WEALTH 01 THE UNITED STATES IN THE PosT-
WAR PERIOD 340 (1962). Goldsmith's estimates are based on IRS Bulletin F.
70 The dimension of the payback is derived by dividing a certain number of dollars
by a number of dollars per year. Typically in a payback calculation the dollars in
the numerator and the denominator are cancelled. This leaves the resulting dimension
in years. There is, however, no reason why the dollars need to be cancelled. The
resulting ratio then represents the number of dollars associated with each dollar per
year.
1 71 Fisher & Lorie, Rates of Return on Investment in Common Stocks, 37 J. Bus. 1
(1964),
72 2 R. GoIDsmrrH, R. LiPsTE & M. ME-DELsoN, STUDIEs IN THE NATIONAL
BALANcE SH r 52-53 (1963).
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utilities, and the evidence on required rate of return does not. This is
particularly important in the case of leverage, the measure of which
will be affected significantly by utilities.
V
We may consider finally the question of the allocative efficiency
of the alternative to management retaining earnings: utilizing the
capital market. There is undoubtedly some imperfection in that market.
Manipulation is hardly unknown. The prices of individual stocks have
sometimes increased beyond levels that rational investors could con-
sider reasonable. The prices of some stocks have plunged precipitously.
The stocks involved could not have been priced properly both before
and after such changes in investors' fortunes. There also may be
cause for concern that the popularity of technical analysis and the
current attempts of some mutual funds to attract investors on the basis
of performance1 3 may damage further whatever effectiveness the
market has as an allocative mechanism. Thus, even if the market is
successful in aligning risks and rates of return in the long-run, it is
patent that in the short-run the rates of return deviate significantly
from the normal.
This may certainly give us pause about preferring the allocative
propensities of the capital market to those of management and about
the desirability of management even looking to the capital market for
guidance. Nevertheless, one may be too hasty in rejecting the capital
market as a socially useful allocative mechanism. It makes errors.
We all do. The real danger lies in the possibility that its errors are
systematic, rather than random. If the errors were indeed systematic,
some investors, such as mutual funds, with significant research re-
sources, will be able to realize results that are significantly better than
random selections of stocks would yield. There is no doubt that the
mutual funds were stung by the findings of the Wharton School about
their performance relative to the market.74 But this is precisely the
kind of result to be expected if the market is effectively pricing secu-
rities. The Wharton School's findings are thus more charitably and
probably more accurately interpreted as a commentary on the efficiency
of the capital market than as a criticism of mutual fund management.75
7 3 Not all performance funds rely on technical analysis.
74 1. FRIE D, F. BROWN, E. HERMAN & D. VICKERS, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDs,
H.R. REP,. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess4 17-18, 294-358 (1962). Although this study
is identified with the Wharton School, with sufficient frequency to justify the type
of reference made here, it does not in fact reflect the views of the School. The School,
as such, holds no official view.
75 The new fashion in stock trading could be a partial recognition of the futility
of trying to find market errors in pricing and of the merit of the Wharton School
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Thus, while short-run aberrations in the performance of the market
should be acknowledged, their significance should not be exaggerated.
Until now the thrust of this discussion has been that the dis-
cipline of the market place stems primarily from the utilization of the
cost of funds as established on the markets as guideposts in decision-
making, rather than from the reliance of business firms upon the
market for the funds it needs. As long as firms utilize the capital
market essentially to determine the appropriate critical rates of return,
short-run fluctuations need not affect allocation. Short-run market
aberrations, however, may influence business decisions via the flow
of funds that is made available. The story of allocation can be quite
different when the discipline of the market is to be exercised directly
through the supply of funds to the corporation.
What may be expected then is a tendency for firms to take ad-
vantage of the positive deviations from the normal-in a word, to
sell securities when they are overpriced. The consequence of this is
that investment proposals which might otherwise not have been worth-
while, become attractive, especially to expansion minded managements.
Under such circumstances, reliance upon the discipline of the market
place leads to precisely those results which the proponents of using the
market are trying to avoid. Furthermore, some major investment
errors-such as the Edsel Division of Ford and the Convair episode
of General Dynamics-might have been undertaken, even if the firms
had required external funds.
Once again, if business firms truly try to optimize the net worth
of the existing stockholders by buying all assets for which the present
value is equal to or greater than the cost, they are in effect discounting
at the cost of funds. Their decision is then dependent upon the
capitalization rate utilized by the market evaluating the income stream
accruing to security holders. All investment decisions under such
circumstances are related to the cost of funds, regardless of how the
investment is financed. When this is true, any forced distribution of
net earnings can only result in additional transaction costs.
Implicit in pro-payout arguments is the assumption that funds
would be equally accessible to all firms. However, some small firms
with hopes of high rates of return even after allowing for additional
findings. The new venture into technical analysis may also prove to be futile. The
many published studies of stock price movements all indicated that following such
movements is hardly a royal road to riches. The disturbances therefore may prove
to be temporary. In the interim-hopefully not an extended interim-the range of
errors generated by the capital market may be broadened.
For an excellent collection of studies of stock price movements, see THE RANDOM
CGARACrER OF STOCK MxAr PRICES (P. Cootner ed. 1964). Possibly studies which
have found price movements effective predictors of future prices have been left dis-
creetly unpublished. This is highly doubtful, but the possibility cannot be dismissed
entirely.
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risk may not have access to funds which would enable them to carry
out all the capital expenditures they would like to undertake.7" If such
firms were able to get all the funds they needed, it is highly doubtful
that the allocation of resources would approach appreciably closer to
the optimum. The mortality rate of small business is high. This
fact, coupled with the fact that some investigations into the cause of
such failures, argues that failure is not caused by the inadequacy of
financing,77 suggests that a reallocation of resources in their favor
would not necessarily be a good utilization of resources. To be sure,
we do not know the mortality rate of ventures undertaken by large
businesses. On the average, such ventures must be profitable or the
aggregate would not be what it is. We do know that large firms can
construct white elephants-again the Edsel Division of Ford is an
example. It is highly possible that we become more conscious of the
few major failures than we do of the many minor successes.
Furthermore, the capital markets very well may have been instru-
mental in channeling funds to inefficient uses. This is at least sug-
gested by the findings of the Wharton School study of the new issue
market. That study found some evidence that the yield on new equity
issues tends to be slightly less than the yield on comparable outstanding
issues.78
Thus the empirical evidence on budgeting methods, as we have
noted, offers little support for the proponents of full payout. The
empirical evidence on performance of firms also offers little such
support. On the other hand, the proponents of full payout seem to
forget that there are two sides to the capital market. The investor's
ability to allocate funds is limited by the choices available to him. If
the market is neutral and all firms pay out all earnings, what assurance
is there that the ambitions of such expansion oriented managements as
may exist will be curtailed any more than those of profit oriented man-
agements? If not, as we have noted, a full payout policy merely adds
the expense of distributing and retrieving funds (and the implicit con-
sumption of resources) to the cost of capital formation.
CONCLUSION
From the finanacial point of view, then, no definitive argument can
be made that superior allocative efficiency is obtained by distribution,
76 Irwin Friend and James R. Longstreet argue that there is not any evidence
of legitimate needs going unsatisfied. See their study, Price Experiences and Returns
on New Stock Issues, in I. Fmwm, J. LoxGsmEEr, M. MErNDsoN, E. MiLL.m &
A. EIEss, INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE NEW ISSUE MARKET (1967).
77 Markham, Trends in the Relative Importance of Simall Business, in BOARD OF
GOVERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEm, FINANcING S .AL BusNEss 197, 213
(1958).
78 Friend & Longstreet, supra note 76, at 80-81.
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rather than retention, of corporate income. Since there can be no
generalized conclusion that it is financially more sound to pursue one
alternative rather than the other, there is no reason to alter the present
presumptions and legal framework within which courts now act when
they pass upon directoral discretion in distributing or retaining cor-
porate income. The significant elements should continue to be the
specific individual corporate needs examined in light of the nature of
the business enterprise, as well as the factors motivating the directors'
decision.79
The real problem of retention may be the one we have largely
ignored, the fact that it facilitates the growth of private power centers
and helps determine the direction in which our social structure evolves. s°
If this is indeed the case, political considerations far outweigh those of
allocative efficiency.'
79 See notes 4-14 and accompanying text supra.
80 See generally GAIBRAIr, supra note 26; THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIET
(E. Mason ed. 1959).
81 Courts may be growing more sensitive to the legal ramifications of such "private
power centers." One commentator has noted that:
In legal account, a lively interest in the attribution of value to power has
already begun. It is illustrated by the case of Perlman v. Feldman, [219 F.2d
173, (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955)], in which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held the sellers, at a price over the market,
of a controlling block of stock in a corporation liable to turn over the excess
to the corporation or (as the remedy was moulded in this case) to divide it
pro rata with their fellow but non-controlling shareholders.
Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 433, 438 (1962).
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